Namibia in the Second Decade of Independence: Successes and Challenges

United States Agency for International Development Windhoek, Namibia

Compiled by Gretchen Bauer in March 2002 and subsequently updated by USAID/Namibia in July 2002

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page number
Introduction	2
The Political	3
The Economic	11
The Social	22
Continued Donor Assistance to Namibia	30
References	35
Interviews	37
Appendix	38
Table 1. Freedom House Ratings of African Countries, 2001-2002 Table 2. Election Results in Namibia by Party: 1989-1999 (in percentages) Table 3. Number of Action Alerts by Country in Southern Africa, 2000 Table 4. Selected Economic Indicators for Namibia, 1993-1999 Table 5. Government Consumption Expenditure in % of Total Expenditure, It table 6. Trends in Economic Performance, SADC Countries Table 7. Demographic Impact of HIV/AIDS in Namibia, 1991-2006 Table 8. HIV/AIDS Estimates for Southern Africa, SSA, and the World, 1999 Table 9. Total Population by Region, 2001 Census Table 10. Human Development Index (HDI) for Namibia, 2000 Table 11. HDI for Namibia, SSA and Other World Regions, 1999 Table 12. Human Poverty Index (HPI) for Namibia, 2000 Table 13. Human Poverty Indices for Selected Southern African Countries, Table 14. Mean monthly income through wages and salaries*; highest five regardless for Selected Indices for Southern Africa, 1999 Table 16. Gender-related Indices for Southern Africa, 1999 Table 17. Official Development Assistance to Selected African Countries, 19	1999 regions, 2000 gions, 2000

Introduction

A large country with a small population of only 1.8 million, Namibia is one of Africa's newest and most promising democracies. Well endowed with a first rate infrastructure and plentiful mineral and abundant fish and livestock resources, Namibia's economy is ranked as one of the most free in Africa. Independent since only 1990, Namibia has made significant strides in recent years in important social sectors such as health and education. Overall, Namibia appears to many as a beacon of hope on a continent where many countries are struggling to survive.

But the outlook for Namibia was not always so favorable. Colonized first by the Germans, until World War I, and then, in effect, by the South Africans until 1990, Namibia suffered the ill effects of colonialism for far longer than other African countries. Moreover, Namibia was subject for decades to the same oppressive system of apartheid experienced under white minority rule in South Africa. Beginning in the 1950s, Namibians sought to end apartheid and colonial rule by South Africa. But it took a 25 year armed struggle waged from exile and led by the nationalist movement, the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), and an international diplomatic battle waged in the corridors of the United Nations, to finally win Namibia's independence. In the meantime, the majority of Namibians suffered from a repressive political system in which they were subjects, not citizens, denied the most fundamental human rights and freedoms. Those in the populous northern war zone were especially affected, living for decades under martial law administered by a hostile and aggressive South African Defence Force. The majority of Namibians also suffered under an economy that has been referred to by some as 'socialism for whites' in which the tiny European population had access to a wide range of perquisites and benefits while the vast African population was exploited for its labor power – as migrant mineworkers, farm workers, domestic workers - often under brutal living and working conditions. Finally, the majority of Namibians suffered too from a social system that classified everyone according to race or ethnicity and that based very uneven access to education, health care and all other social amenities and services on that classification. Colonialism and apartheid rule in Namibia left behind a legacy that will take decades to undo.

Yet despite this potential legacy, when independence was finally achieved on 21 March 1990, the prospects for Namibia seemed very favorable. A year long transition to

independence, supervised by the United Nations, culminated in universal franchise elections in November 1989, deemed free and fair by all observers. In those elections the liberation movement SWAPO won a resounding victory (but not the two thirds majority that would be required to amend the constitution), gaining 57 percent of the vote. Out of that election a Constituent Assembly was formed and a constitution was drafted in what was, by all accounts, a remarkably consensual process. The constitution was quickly hailed as one of the most liberal and democratic in the world; it contains entrenched clauses guaranteeing fundamental human rights and freedoms, including freedoms of association and expression and an uncensored press. The constitution also includes the proscription of arbitrary arrest, detention without trial and the death penalty, and it enshrines the right of individual property ownership and the payment of just compensation for any expropriation of property. In early 1990, the Constituent Assembly was reconstituted as the nation's first National Assembly, with members from seven political parties, and longtime SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma was elected the nation's first President. Shortly after independence, President Nujoma made clear his government's intention to follow a policy of national reconciliation among all races and ethnic groups in Namibia. Moreover, he committed his government to a 'mixed economy,' one that values the private sector and allocates to government the important role of creating an enabling environment for that private sector. Within a short while, the government elaborated a set of development objectives aimed at redressing the discrimination and imbalances of the colonial and apartheid past.

Now in its second decade of independence, Namibia is at a crossroads. It has experienced many successes during the first 10 years, but it also continues to face a number of pressing challenges. These successes and challenges are elaborated in greater detail below.

The Political

According to Freedom House's most recent survey of freedom in the world,¹
Namibia was one of 86 'free' countries in 2001-02; 58 countries were 'partly free' and 48

_

¹ "The Survey is an evaluation of political rights and civil liberties in the world. The Survey assesses a country's freedom by examining its record in two areas: political rights and civil liberties. A country grants its citizens political rights when it permits them to form political parties that represent a significant range of voter choice and whose leaders can openly compete for and be elected to positions of power in government. A country upholds its citizens' civil liberties when it respects and protects their religious, ethnic, economic, linguistic, and other rights, including gender and family rights, personal freedoms, and freedoms of the press, belief and association." www.freedomhouse.org

countries were 'not free.' Namibia was one of only nine free countries in Africa, the others being Cape Verde, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa, Benin, Botswana, Ghana, and Mali. Twenty-five countries in Africa were rated partly free and 19 were ranked not free. Of 53 African countries, 20 (including Namibia) are considered electoral democracies. In Africa during 2001-02, seven countries "registered gains for freedom, while nine suffered setbacks." (See Table 1.)

Namibia's status as a 'free' country and an electoral democracy is well supported by the record. Namibia has an executive President and a bicameral legislature. The National Assembly (the lower house) has 72 members elected by universal franchise for six year terms (as well as six non-voting members appointed by the President); the National Council (upper house or house of review) has 26 members nominated by the 13 regional councils for five year terms.² According to the constitution, the President is limited to two consecutive terms in office, and the Presidential and National Assembly terms run concurrently. [Before the 1999 elections, the constitution was amended to allow President Sam Nujoma, only, to run for a third term (since he was not 'popularly elected' in 1989, rather was elected by Namibia's first National Assembly). In late 2001 President Nujoma announced publicly his intention not to run for a fourth term in 2004 which would, in any case, not be permitted by the constitution.]

The constitution provides for the separation of powers and, hence, an independent judiciary. Judicial power in Namibia is exercised by a Supreme Court, a High Court and a number of Magistrate and Lower courts. Moreover, as mentioned, the constitution contains an entrenched bill of rights that guarantees fundamental human rights and freedoms and that has been largely respected since independence.³ The constitution also provides for the establishment of two offices meant to protect democracy and promote accountability, namely, the Offices of the Ombudsman and the Auditor General. Both offices were established in 1990 and have operated actively, albeit with limited resources, ever since.

_

² National Assembly and local authority elections in Namibia utilize a proportional representation party list electoral system whereas the regional council elections utilize a first-past-the-post or winner-take-all electoral system.

³ According to the Human Rights Report issued by the United States State Department in 2002 there were some abuses of human rights in Namibia in 2001, including in the Kavango and Caprivi region along the country's northern border with Angola. However, the report concluded that "the Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens."

Including the elections for a Constituent Assembly in 1989, seven elections have been held in Namibia since the transition to independence. Following the demarcation of the country into 13 new regions (to replace the so-called ethnic homelands of the colonial era) and the incorporation of dozens of municipalities, towns and villages, local authority and regional council elections were held in December 1992. In December 1994 National Assembly and Presidential elections were held. In 1998 a second round of local authority and regional council elections were held, in February and December, respectively. In December 1999 a second round of National Assembly and Presidential elections were held. Since 1989 all elections have been held under Namibian auspices and all have generally been deemed free and fair, although serious concerns were raised about the quality of the 1999 National Assembly and Presidential election campaign. With the exception of the 1998 local and regional elections, voter turnout in Namibia has generally been fairly high, ranging from 98 percent in 1989 to 62 percent in 1999. (See Table 2.) By contrast, the voter turnout rate was only 33.75 percent in the February 1998 local elections and 40 percent in the December 1998 regional elections. In both cases, according to post-election analyses, non-voters were motivated not to vote for three broad reasons: negative feelings toward political actors, special circumstances relating to the electoral process and apathy or lethargy (Keulder, 1999, 18-19).

In the 1989 Constituent Assembly elections 10 parties fielded candidates and seven were represented in the first National Assembly. In the 1999 National Assembly elections seven parties contested the elections and four won seats. With the exception of the 1998 local and regional elections, the ruling party SWAPO has steadily increased its share of the vote in each election, such that by 1999 it received 76 percent of the vote. Indeed, since the 1994 elections SWAPO has had a two-thirds majority in both chambers of Parliament. At the Presidential level there has also been no alternation of power, with President Sam Nujoma, the much revered leader of the liberation struggle, handily winning re-election in 1994 and 1999. These trends have caused many observers to consider Namibia, like many other developing and some developed countries, a one party dominant state.

⁴ According to a number of sources, that campaign was marked by some intimidation of opposition parties and their supporters, in the form of disruption of rallies, assaults on opposition party officials and the stoning of their vehicles. Ruling party officials, it is charged, encouraged such tactics through the use of inflammatory speeches and smear campaigns. The campaign was made still unfair, it is charged, by the access to state resources, such as transport, enjoyed by the ruling party.

At the same time, Namibia's political system can still be considered a multiparty political system. Since independence the formation of political parties and a host of party coalitions has proceeded largely unfettered. Currently the most formidable opposition to the ruling party comes from the Congress of Democrats (COD), formed only in early 1999 by a group of former SWAPO members and officeholders. In the 1999 elections, COD edged out the Democratic Turnhalle Opposition (DTA) as the main opposition, winning 9.9 percent of the vote compared to the DTA's 9.4 percent of the vote. The DTA then formed a coalition with the United Democratic Front (UDF), making the coalition the largest opposition force in the National Assembly and therefore the "official opposition." The Congress of Democrats is considered to have better long term prospects than the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance which remains tarnished by its association with pre-independence governments and recently has had a number of embarrassing internal problems. The COD aims to win 30 percent of the vote in the 2004 elections by focusing, in particular, on first-time voters, the youth more broadly, and those urban areas in which the party already has a significant base (Windhoek and Swakopmund).

Namibia's Parliament – the National Assembly established in 1990 and the National Council established in 1993 - is one of the most professional in Africa. Members of Parliament (MPs) and their staff routinely participate in workshops and seminars to improve their skills and training, as well as taking study tours abroad. New Members of Parliament participate in a week long Induction Program, organized by the National Democratic Institute, to acquaint themselves with the national legislature and their role in it. In 1996 the first functioning standing committees were formed; 10 are now active in the National Assembly and seven in the National Council. These committees allow for higher levels of legislative review and for the more consistent provision of information among MPs. The work of the standing committees is guided by standing rules and orders and supported by staff in the form of clerks and legal advisers and a research services division. The committee system also allows for increased citizen participation in the legislative process, as relevant committees now hold public hearings on pending legislation at the national and regional level. Parliament, in conjunction with the Legal Assistance Centre, further attempts to engage and inform the public through the dissemination of bill summaries and booklets meant to explain the budget process. Finally, the Namibian Parliament has on-site facilities for radio and television broadcasts of legislative sessions and public hearings. The

Parliament of Namibia has also launched its own interactive website,
www.parliament.gov.na, which it is introducing to Namibia's far-flung regions through a computer equipped mobile training unit.

While a "dense network" of voluntary associations may not yet fully exist in Namibia, civil society and its organizations have grown considerably in the years since independence. According to one recent survey there are currently about 220 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Namibia: 160 NGOs and 60 community-based organizations (though many of these are very small, even inactive). The major areas of NGO intervention in Namibia are agriculture and rural development and education and training. Organizations of civil society in Namibia work both with government, to address critical development needs, and on their own in identifying and advocating for their own agendas for social, political and economic action. NGOs in several sectors work in tandem with their relevant ministries; others collaborate with the National Planning Commission on development policy and programs or participate in the legislative process by attending committee hearings or meeting with legislators and their staffs. Several NGOs focus on independent organizing, constituency mobilization, and provision of information, all essential elements in expanding civil society's role and strengthening its voice. These include some of the larger, more prominent NGOs in Namibia such as the Namibia Institute of Democracy, the Legal Assistance Centre, the Labour Resource and Research Institute, the Namibian Society for Human Rights, Sister Namibia, the Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit, the Institute for Public Policy Research, the Namibia Institute for Democracy, and the new local chapter of Transparency International. The Namibia Nongovernmental Organizations' Forum (NANGOF), formed in 1991, acts as an umbrella body to many of Namibia's NGOs though has recently suffered some financial management setbacks.

An integral part of an active civil society is a free and independent media. Indeed, a significant level of media freedom has existed in Namibia throughout the first decade of independence. Namibia has an impressive array of government, private, and community media sources. The national radio broadcasts throughout the country in every Namibian language. In recent years, there has been a proliferation of independent radio stations and even an attempt, likely to be revived in the not too distant future, to form a community radio station in Katutura, outside Windhoek. The national television network, the Namibian

Broadcasting Corporation, is government owned, as are a number of newspapers and magazines, but operates with some measure of independence. A new private television station, Desert Entertainment TV, has recently been launched, and three independent dailies and a host of smaller private newspapers and magazines vie with one another for readers from among the national populace. The privately owned and operated media in Namibia are fiercely independent, and editors and columnists freely voice their criticisms of government and other institutions.

Still, according to Freedom House's *Press Freedom Survey 2001*, Namibia was one of 17 'partly free' countries in Africa in terms of press freedom in 2000.⁵ [There were six 'free' countries in terms of press freedom in Africa in 2000 – Benin, Botswana, Mali, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, and South Africa – and 30 'not free countries'.] According to the *Press Freedom Survey 2001*, in Namibia: "Constitutional guarantees of press freedom are usually respected in practice. Private radio stations and critical independent newspapers mostly operate without official interference, but reporters for state-run media have been subjected to indirect and direct pressure to avoid reporting on controversial topics." This was the third year in a row in which Namibia was ranked 'partly free' in terms of press freedom. In 1997, Namibia was ranked among the 'free' countries in terms of press freedom. Even so, Namibia's score, of 34, puts it very close to the 'free' category (1-30) and at the very top of the 'partly free' category (31-60).

The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), whose secretariat is based in Windhoek, monitors press freedom in the region. One issue of recent concern to MISA was the Namibian government's decision, in late 2000, to withdraw advertising from *The Namibian* newspaper and then to withdraw government purchases of the newspaper for all government offices (MISA, 68). This was allegedly due to critical and unpatriotic reporting by *The Namibian*. Other incidents of concern to MISA during 2000 included allegations from a SWAPO Member of Parliament that the press was foreign owned and out to "hoodwink" the nation, and the disruption by a deputy minister and the police of an opposition party press conference (MISA, 69-81). Among Southern African countries, Namibia was in the middle range, in terms of action alerts issued by the Media Institute of Southern Africa during 2000. (See Table 3). At the same time, in the view of MISA's

_

⁵ Out of 187 countries worldwide, there were 72 'free' countries in 2000, in terms of press freedom, 53 'partly free' countries and 62 'not free' countries. Freedom House, 2001.

Regional Director Luckson Chipare, press freedom is much greater in Namibia than in some other MISA member countries. In Chipare's view, a key concern for Namibia must be maintaining editorial independence throughout the media and achieving the three tier system of public, commercial and community media that MISA advocates throughout the region.

Freedom House's *Press Freedom Survey 2001* focused, in particular, on the question of freedom on the Internet worldwide. Namibia was considered by the survey of freedom on the Internet to have "moderately restrictive" web policies⁶ - most likely because of still limited "internet penetration." At the same time, the Press Freedom Survey 2001 also noted that "Internet access is available without government restriction" in Namibia. According to the survey of freedom on the Internet, there were four Internet service providers (ISPs) in Namibia in 2000 and about 9,000 users (0.55 percent of the population). [In 2000, Botswana had two ISPs and 12,000 users (0.76 percent of the population) while South Africa had 58 ISPs and 1.8 million users (4.19 percent of the population). Botswana's web policies were also considered moderately restrictive while South Africa's were considered least restrictive. (Freedom House, 2001, 28, 41.)] With its 9,000 Internet users, Namibia was ranked 13th among 29 African countries in terms of absolute number of Internet users, according to the African Competitiveness Report 2000-2001. Namibia was ranked second, after South Africa, in terms of Internet hosts per 10,000 people, but first in the availability of Internet access, followed by Tunisia and South Africa (WEF, 269-272). According to the Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit (32): "The number of Internet users has steadily increased since 1995 in Namibia and the flat rate access to the Internet in real terms has been falling. However, prices for 20 hours online per month have increased since 1996 in real terms due to increases in fixed line telephone rates." Barriers to the spread of the Internet, according to NEPRU, include the price of Internet access, the shortage of infrastructure (e.g. telephone lines), and the availability of content.

While Internet access in Namibia is already considered relatively good, the country is taking further steps to improve the regulatory and policy environment governing the telecommunications sector. In May 2002, the Namibian cabinet approved a forward-looking ICT Policy that seeks to expand rural access to information and communication

_

⁶ According to the survey (1): "Moderate restriction includes political as well as economic limitation on access to the Web and legal or administrative restrictions on content with punishment for violations." The level of restriction is decided based on internet penetration in a country, the regulatory environment and the cost of internet access.

technologies (ICTs). Further, it is hoped that Parliament will pass a long-awaited Communications Bill towards the end of 2002. If passed intact, the new act will establish a new telecommunications regulatory body that will be empowered to liberalize the telecommunications sector and address many of the issues identified by NEPRU. This bill and new ICT Policy, taken in tandem, will create within Namibia perhaps the most progressive telecommunications policy environment in Africa.

Together, all of these factors contribute toward the consolidation of democracy, the much more difficult task confronting Namibia, now that the transition to democracy has been accomplished. According to an *Afrobarometer*⁷ survey of Namibia conducted in 1999, Namibia has made significant progress in the first decade of independence toward the consolidation of democracy. This is especially true with regard to people's attitudes toward democracy and their relationship to their government. The survey concludes that (Keulder, 2002, 46):

Although democracy is not yet the "only game in town," support for democracy is strong among the majority of Namibians. By far the majority of respondents reject non-democratic alternatives to democracy. There are at this point in time no clearly defined segments of Namibian society that put forward strong demands for non-democratic forms of rule.

The relationship between citizens and their state is also positive. Most respondents regard the current government as legitimate. They also believe the system is responsive to their needs and they trust the government. These are valuable commodities for any government that assumes power after a prolonged period of authoritarian rule. There is no clearly definable group of Namibians that express strongly negative attitudes toward the current government. The system is also regarded as relatively free from corruption, and actual personal experiences with corruption are minimal.

Most respondents are happy with the performance of democracy thus far. Although some of them see minor problems, few regard the system as non-democratic. Elections are generally regarded as free and fair, and where problems are identified, these are regarded as minor. Furthermore, most acknowledge that democracy has brought an improvement in both economic and political rights. Respondents are generally satisfied with current economic conditions and remain hopeful about the future.

⁷ For Africa, the *Afrobarometer* series facilitates a comparative approach to democratic consolidation around the continent. The *Afrobarometer* series utilizes a political culture approach to democratic consolidation, according to which "democracy can only be considered consolidated once it is 'legitimated' or seen by all significant political actors and an overwhelming majority of citizens as 'the only game in town'" (Mattes et al, 8).

For Southern Africa as a whole, *Afrobarometer* surveys were conducted in seven countries in 1999 and 2000. When compared to residents in five other Southern African countries (not including South Africa), Namibians were found to be "the most satisfied of all countries in the survey with their overall political system. They are very satisfied with the performance of President Sam Nujoma and the SWAPO government and invest them with high levels of trust. They also see relatively low levels of corruption in government" (Mattes et al, 5). As for the future, Namibians generally want their government to place its priorities on job creation, education and the provision of services (ibid).

The Economic

With a per capita income of US\$ 1,940 in 1998⁸, Namibia is considered by the World Bank (11) to be a lower middle income country. That per capita income, however, masks great inequalities in the distribution of wealth and income and access to resources (see below). From 1995 to 2001 Namibia experienced an average economic growth rate of 3.5 percent, "1.5 percent below the target of public policy, but slightly above the rate of population growth resulting in an average increase of 0.3 percent in real [gross domestic product] GDP per capita over the period" (OECD, 231). According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (11), real GDP growth will be "subdued" during 2002, at 3.5 percent, "owing to the poor global outlook and a downward revision to the data for 1999 and 2000." But the prospects for 2003 are promising – a projected real GDP growth rate of 5 percent based on a rebound in diamond production and the opening of the Skorpion zinc mine and refinery (and associated infrastructure developments) in southern Namibia. The unemployment rate in Namibia was estimated at 35 percent in 1998, although much higher for 15 to 19 year olds (62 percent) and 20 to 24 year olds (55 percent) (UNDP, 2000, 6). (See Table 4 for selected economic indicators, 1993-1999.)

In the early years after independence, government identified four major development objectives. These have been to achieve and maintain an annual economic growth rate of five percent per year, to create ample opportunities for employment, to reduce the inequalities in income distribution and to design economic and social programs that will

_

⁸ According to the Institute for Public Policy Research (<u>www.ippr.org.na</u>): "In 2000 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stood at N\$ 23.8 bn (US\$ 3.5 bn) implying an average income of around N\$ 12,774 (US\$ 1,871) per person."

alleviate poverty and help vulnerable groups in society. In general, the government of Namibia has followed a set of sound liberal economic policies since independence. In recent years, this has included an attempt to improve the performance and accountability of more than 20 state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Indeed, there is even serious consideration being given to the privatization (or 'part-privatization') of some of these SOEs, although "this remains a highly sensitive issue for the government in view of strong opposition from powerful public-sector unions" (EIU, 16-17). The only privatization of an SOE announced so far is that of Air Namibia, the national airline, scheduled to begin 1 April 2002 and be completed by 1 July 2002. In the course of that privatization the Namibian government will cut its shareholding in the airline from 100 percent to 25 percent (*The Namibian*, 20 March 2002, 1).

The 'land question' remains another sensitive issue in Namibia, with overall arable land distribution skewed to the advantage of a minority. Indeed, 4,200 (white) commercial farmers raising cattle and sheep in central and southern Namibia own 43 percent of the country's total land mass, while 150,000 (black) subsistence farmer households growing maize and millet in northern Namibia occupy 42 percent of the country's total land mass. Moreover, the fencing of communal lands in the North by the rich and politically powerful, as well as the historical neglect of the northern communal areas (in terms of agricultural extension services, access to credit and other inputs, environmental degradation, etc.), has further limited access to productive land and income among those same subsistence households.

A land conference attended by hundreds of Namibians in 1990 yielded no concrete results on the issue of land reform. Beginning in 1995, however, the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act empowered the government to acquire commercial farms for resettlement, on a "willing seller, willing buyer" basis only. The acquisition and allocation of land is further guided by the White Paper on Resettlement Policy of 1997 and the National Land Policy of 1998. By early 2002, 110 farms had been acquired by government, some of them donated, amounting to about 650,325 hectares (*The Namibian*, 27 February 2002). More recently the government has proposed a land tax, scheduled to be introduced in April 2002, which will, among other things, generate funds for the government to buy land for redistribution and resettlement. Very few observers envision a Zimbabwe-like resolution of the land issue in Namibia. As NEPRU (2001a, 18) notes: "There is

widespread consensus in Namibia that the forcible occupation of primarily white-owned farms does not represent the most efficient way of addressing land redistribution. Senior politicians have consistently committed themselves and the government to acquire land in terms of the Constitution and existing legislation."

The Namibian economy remains one based on its primary sectors: mining, fishing and commercial agriculture (livestock ranching), all of which are vulnerable to external shock. The short term prospects for all three sectors are generally positive. Diamonds, uranium, copper, zinc and a number of other minerals are all mined in Namibia, with diamonds most significant to the Namibian economy. While diamond output fell in 2001 due to quotas imposed by the De Beers' Diamond Trading Company, the ending of quotas, stronger free market prices, further increases in recoveries and full capacity production are expected to boost production in 2003. As noted, zinc mining production at the Skorpion mine and refinery will begin in 2003, further boosting mining growth. Higher fishing quotas for 2002, in particular for hake and mackerel, will produce strong growth in both the fishing and fish processing industries in the year ahead as well. Finally, agricultural output, in particular beef exports, are expected to increase during 2002 as well, due to anticipated good rains and higher demand as a result of cattle disease in Europe. Livestock and meatprocessing output are expected to grow strongly during 2002-03 (EIU, 10-12). The Kudu gas field in Namibia remains to be brought into production. And, exploration for oil continues off the Namibian coast with optimism high about the prospects for finding oil. Exploitation of gas and oil would bring increased revenues to government and more jobs to the populace.

Namibia's manufacturing sector will get a boost from three new textile factories in Windhoek in the years ahead. Ramatex Textiles Namibia, a Malaysia based firm, has already built a large textile and clothing complex in the Windhoek suburb of Otjomuise. The company promises to hire 8,000 workers and training of many has already commenced. On 13 March 2002 agreements were signed between the municipality of Windhoek and two more companies, Rhino Garments Namibia and Tai Wah Garments, for the building of two additional textile factories. Rhino Garments Namibia is a Taiwanese company and Tai Wah Garments is a subsidiary of Ramatex and one of the leading producers of clothing for Nike. The two factories together are expected to create at least 2,000 more jobs (*The Namibian*, 14 March 2002, 15). All three of these companies are seeking to take advantage of Namibia's

eligibility under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act to export textiles and clothing duty free to the United States (EIU, 23).⁹

The textile and clothing factories (and the aforementioned Skorpion zinc mine and refinery) are part of an overall government strategy to attract industry to Namibia (and diversify the economy), namely, the establishment in 1995 of export processing zones (EPZs) in Namibia. By 2000, 24 companies with EPZ status were in operation, with several more expected to be brought into operation during 2001. By 2000 nearly 1,000 jobs had been generated with that number expected to rise during 2001 (NEPRU, 2001a, 18-19). Most factories are being set up in Walvis Bay though it is possible for factories elsewhere to qualify for the EPZ incentives. These include exemption from corporate income taxes, customs duties, sales taxes, transfer taxes and stamp duties. Moreover, the Port of Walvis Bay also plans to offer "EPZ-type benefits" to investors in the future as part of the Walvis Bay Corridor development (www.namport.com.na).

On a related note, Namibia attracted US\$ 124 million worth of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2000 (www.unctad.org). This is more than the foreign direct investment to Namibia during the previous three years, although not as much as in 1995 and 1996. While Namibia is not one of the top 10 African countries in terms of FDI inflows, what is more significant for Namibia is the economic stimulus in the form of backward and forward linkages from that investment. Indeed, according to NEPRU (2001b), "it is encouraging to note that more FDI in processing and manufacturing activities are (sic) expected in the near future than in resource-extracting activities with limited linkages to the rest of the economy."

-

⁹ A number of environmental and other concerns have been raised about the Ramatex and other textile factories. Environmental activists charge that "the dyeing process used in the textile industry produces large amounts of polluted waste, including potentially harmful toxins, and it is unclear what procedures will be used for its safe disposal" (EIU, 23). Other concerns include uncertainty over how much water the textile factories will require and fears over the treatment of workers. Civil society and government are engaged in an on-going dialogue on the issues.

¹⁰ The Walvis Bay Corridor is a system of newly constructed land routes providing direct transport links between Walvis Bay and potential trading partners in central and southern Africa. The new corridor is expected to generate valuable business opportunities along these routes and for the port and community of Walvis Bay. The primary aim of the Walvis Bay Corrider is to foster reciprocal trade with Namibia's eastern neighbors, using the Port of Walvis Bay as the loading and discharging point for sea traffic. In addition, the Walivs Bay Corridor offers the exciting prospect of linking up with the Maputo Corridor to provide a major transport link across the breadth of southern Africa. This in turn would lead to new opportunities for trade with countries along the route of the linking corridors. www.namport.com.na

The textile factories and potential gas and oil projects will have a significant impact on Namibia's primary port facility in Walvis Bay (and on Namibian rail lines). Namibia's port facilities at Walvis Bay have already been rated of the best quality and most cost effective among 29 African countries surveyed in the Africa Competitiveness Report 2000-2001. Moreover, Namibia has the greatest capacity in rail lines with the highest number of rail lines per capita among 29 African countries (WEF, 268, 273-274). Two improvements to port facilities at Walvis Bay in recent years – the building of a new container terminal in 1999 and the deepening of the main port approach channel in 2000 – and the completion of the Trans Kalahari Highway make the Port of Walvis Bay a potential transport and export hub not only for Namibia but for neighboring countries as well. 12 Thus the opportunity exists for Namibia to become the much vaunted 'gateway to SADC' - the Southern African Development Community – and its nearly 200 million people. (Largely because of the port and Namibia's modern highway access to Botswana, South Africa, Angola and Zambia, Namibia was the fifth largest destination of U.S. exports to Africa in 2001.) Two European shipping lines have recognized the importance of Walvis Bay. MACS lines introduced the Port of Walvis Bay as part of its long term schedule in mid 2000, providing a direct service from Europe to Walvis Bay as the first port of call in Southern Africa. Maersk Sealand followed suit, offering a direct southbound route from Europe to Walvis Bay (terminating transshipment at Cape Town). In announcing this route, Maersk noted: "With this upgrade, Maersk Sealand provides a strong and competitive product allowing our clients in Namibia, as well as clients in other SADC countries, to offer a competitive product via the Walvis Bay Corridor both import-and export wise" (www.namport.com.na). Rumor has it that Maersk also plans to establish a direct route from Walvis Bay to the USA.

Clearly, Namibia's economy relies heavily on international trade with imports and exports each totaling more than half of GDP in value (www.ippr.com.na). In 1998 the main destinations for Namibia's exports were the United Kingdom (43 percent), South Africa (26

_

¹¹ On quality of port facilities and inland waterways Namibia was number one followed by Tunisia, Mauritius, Egypt, Senegal, Ghana and South Africa. On cost, Namibia was number one followed by Egypt, Tunisia, Senegal, South Africa, and Ghana.

¹² From the Namport website, www.namport.com.na: "During an interview with a regional transport publication recently the question was asked: Why should a customer switch to the Port of Walvis Bay? The reasons given were clearly stated: It is the shortest possible route from/to any destination west of the continent, time and cost savings, modern well equipped infrastructure, spare capacities, ensured reliability of cargo deliveries, cargo security and customers convenience, and, also smooth and efficient operations on the Trans Kalahari Highway."

percent), Spain (14 percent) and France (8 percent). The main origins of Namibia's imports in 1997 were South Africa (81 percent), the United States (4 percent), Germany (2 percent), and Zimbabwe (1 percent) (EIU, 6). In 2001, US exports to Namibia were valued at US\$ million 255.6, the fourth highest amount after South Africa, Nigeria, and Angola. US imports from Namibia in 2001 were valued at US\$ million 37.3 (United States Department of Commerce).

With Namibia's stunning landscapes and unique wildlife, the tourism sector is considered an area of great potential growth. Indeed, the number of tourists visiting Namibia increased by 9.2 percent in 2000 – from 684,507 visitors in 1999 to 753,660 visitors in 2000 (NEPRU, 2001a, 26). Projecting an annual increase of 10 percent in the number of tourists to Namibia (and capitalizing on cross border tourism from South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe), the government expects one million visitors to the country by 2010 (NPC, 13-14). Partly in response to the anticipated influx of tourists, a Namibia Tourism Board was launched in April 2001. In general, the Tourism Board is responsible for monitoring, regulating and promoting tourism in Namibia. Community based tourism is an increasingly important part of the tourism industry in Namibia, as well. From 1999 to 2000 the number of visitors to facilities of the Namibia Community Based Tourism Association nearly doubled, from 30,000 in 1999 to 58,900 in 2000. Membership in the community based tourism association itself increased from 40 communities in 1999 to 45 in 2000 and is expected to grow by six percent annually. According to NEPRU, community based tourism must also be seen as an important poverty reduction strategy for Namibia: "Growth in this sector gives the communities the incentives to manage local resources sustainably and allows communities the opportunity to diversify incomes away from agriculture" (NEPRU, 2001a, 28). Indeed, in 1998, the National Planning Commission (13) identified the tourism sector, with its "high potential to create jobs in the near-term" as one of three opportunities for income generation in the near future.

As suggested above, Namibia scores well on a number of international economic rankings, especially with respect to other African countries. The Heritage Foundation and *Wall Street Journal* publish an annual *Index of Economic Freedom* that ranks 161 countries according to the freedom of their economies. The *Index* provides detailed information on 10 factors of economic freedom including trade policy, government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, wages and prices, property

rights, parallel economies, and more. On the 2002 Index of Economic Freedom, Namibia tied for 60th place with four other countries - Botswana, Ivory Coast, Mali and South Africa – for sub-Saharan Africa's top spot and a score of 2.90.¹³ According to this score, then, Namibia's economy is deemed 'mostly free.' The country's overall score, and thus its rank and category, have remained more or less the same since 1997 (between 2.85 and 2.95) when it was first included in the *Index*. Namibia scores best in the areas of capital flows and foreign investment (low barriers), wages and prices (low level of intervention), and property rights (high level of protection). Namibia does less well in the areas of government expenditure (very high level of government expenditure) and trade policy (high level of protectionism) due to its membership in the Southern African Customs Union.

Using a number of different criteria, the Fraser Institute and the Cato Institute publish another report that aims to measure economic freedom around the world. *Economic Freedom of the World:* 2001 Annual Report is the fifth such joint publication by the two institutes and presents economic freedom data for 123 countries for 1999. Components used to construct this index include, broadly, size of government, structure of the economy and use of markets, monetary policy and price stability, freedom to use alternative currencies, legal structure and property rights, international exchange and freedom of exchange in financial markets. Out of the 123 countries cited in *Economic Freedom of the World:* 2001 Annual Report, Namibia is tied with Botswana for 50th place with a score of 6.9 (out of 10). The only African countries ranked more free than Botswana and Namibia were Mauritius, Uganda, and South Africa. Moreover, in nine years (since independence) the Namibian economy became markedly more free. In 1990, Namibia was tied with the Dominican Republic, Israel, Poland, Togo and Zimbabwe for 80th place, with a score of 4.6 (Gwartney and Lawson, 10). In 1990, Namibia was far behind a number of other developing and African countries including South Africa, Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, Kenya and others. In

-

¹³ "Each country receives its overall economic freedom score based on the average of the 10 individual factor scores. Each factor is scored according to a grading scale that is unique for that factor. The scales run from 1 to 5: A score of 1 signifies an institutional or consistent set of policies that are most conducive to economic freedom, while a score of 5 signifies a set of policies that are least conducive. In addition, each factor score is followed by a description – better, worse, or stable – to indicate, respectively, whether that factor of economic freedom is improving, is getting worse, or has stayed the same compared with the country's score last year. Finally, the factors are added and averaged, and an overall score is assigned to the country." Heritage Foundation and *Wall Street Journal*, chapter 5, www.heritage.org

¹⁴ The four broad categories of the index are: free – overall score of 1.95 or less; mostly free – overall score of 2.00-2.95; mostly unfree – overall score of 3.00-3.95; repressed – overall score of 4.00 or higher. Heritage Foundation and *Wall Street Journal*, chapter 5, www.heritage.org

1999, Namibia did especially well in the areas of legal structure and property rights (getting a perfect score of 10), monetary and price stability, and international exchange (7.6 in both areas overall). Again, Namibia does much less well in the area of size of government where it received only a 2.5 out of 10.

The World Economic Forum publishes an annual *Global Competitiveness Report* that assesses the comparative strengths and weaknesses of national economies around the world. It also publishes regional reports, including an Africa Competitiveness Report (ACR). 15 In the ACR for 2000-2001 Namibia is ranked fourth overall among African countries, in terms of economic competitiveness, following Tunisia, Mauritius, and Botswana. The other high performing African economies, according to the ACR 2000-2001 Competitiveness Index, were South Africa, Egypt and Morocco (WEF, 176, 18). Namibia's ACR national competitiveness balance sheet for 2000-2001 shows a number of assets and only a few liabilities. Assets include a high level of openness to trade, predictable and reliable government policies and officials, a sound financial system, very high quality infrastructure, and an effective legal system that enforces the rule of law. Liabilities include high government expenditure and deficits, insufficient paved roads, and a very high HIV prevalence (with negative consequences for the labor market) (WEF, 181). Indeed, Namibia scores especially well in the area of infrastructure; it is ranked first among African countries in terms of quality of roads, total rail lines per population, availability of internet access, and the cost and quality of port facilities. Namibia is ranked second in terms of vehicles per capita, number of Internet hosts per 10,000 people and electric power supply. Other areas in which Namibia does particularly well include certainty of rules and laws and a fair court system (again ranked second among African countries surveyed) (WEF, 181).

Finally, the 2001 Corruption Perceptions Index, published by Transparency International (234), ranks Namibia 30th out of 90 countries worldwide in terms of the perception of corruption. ¹⁶ The Transparency International *CPI* is a composite index based on data about the perceived level of corruption as seen by business elites, the general public, and professional country analysts. The only African country 'cleaner' than Namibia was

¹⁵ For the *ACR 2000-2001* data were collected for 29 African countries. In all, 1800 businesses around the continent were surveyed for their views on institutions, infrastructure, labor, finance, government, openness, health, exports, foreign direct investment and governance. Countries are ranked according to business responses to questions on these and other topics. WEF, 18.

¹⁶ The cleanest country of 90 on the 2001 CPI was Finland with a score of 9.9. The United States tied with Israel for the 16th rank on the list with a score of 7.6.

Botswana, ranked 26th, with a score of 6.0, compared to Namibia's score of 5.4.¹⁷ South Africa tied with Lithuania as the 38th 'cleanest' of 90 countries surveyed by Transparency International, with a score of 4.8. The results presented in the *Africa Competitiveness Report 2000-2001* are similar. Namibia was the third 'cleanest' of 26 African countries in terms of business executives' perceived levels of corruption, following Seychelles and Botswana. Namibia scored 14.3 out of 16 (clean), as compared with 14.4 for Botswana and 15.2 for Seychelles (WEF, 71).

Inside Namibia tackling corruption is a priority issue for many. In November 2001, Namibia's National Assembly approved an anti-corruption bill that would, among other things, establish an Anti-Corruption Commission. In February 2002, the National Council rejected the bill, objecting, in particular, to the proposed Anti-Corruption Commission. The National Council argued (and others agree, for example, the former Attorney General and the Transparency International¹⁸) that the mandate of the proposed commission is already covered by the Office of the Ombudsman. Establishing a second body would be expensive, according to the National Council, and would lead to an unnecessary duplication of institutions and even to legal conflicts among institutions performing identical or similar tasks (*The Namibian*, 13 February 2002). The anti-corruption bill is now back in the National Assembly.

Namibia belongs to a number of regional, continental and international organizations. Namibia is a member of the Common Monetary Area (CMA) with South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland. Namibia also belongs to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) with South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana. SACU countries trade freely with one another and a common tariff applies to all imports from outside the customs union. Namibia is also a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Namibia also belongs to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (www.ippr.org.na).

¹⁷ The '2001 CPI score' ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). Transparency International, 236.

¹⁸ See Jeremy Pope. 2001. Namibia's Anti-Corruption Bill: An Anti-Corruption Commission cannot fight corruption on its own. *IPPR Opinion No. 5*. Windhoek: IPPR.

Unfortunately, Namibia's economy – and polity and society – will be dramatically affected in the years ahead by the HIV/AIDS crisis currently ravaging Southern Africa and other parts of the African continent. Namibia is one of the most severely affected countries in the world, with an overall HIV prevalence rate of 22.3 percent of the adult population. According to the UNDP, the HIV/AIDS epidemic poses "the number one threat to human development" in Namibia. As the UNDP (2000, 11) further reports for Namibia:

- ?? HIV/AIDS is the number one cause of death accounting for 26 percent of all deaths in hospitals in 1999.
- ?? In 1999, some 14,000 Namibians were HIV positive and had not yet died of AIDS. This has risen rapidly to 28,200 in 1992, 50,000 in 1993, 77,400 in 1994, and now tripling to 240,200 by 2001 (relative to a national population in 2001 of about 1.9 million).
- ?? Approximately 22.3 percent of the sexually active population is carrying the virus.
- ?? In 1999 women counted for 54 percent of all new infections.

The demographic impact of the HIV epidemic in Namibia, as elsewhere, will be significant. In 15 years, from 1991 to 2006, Namibia's population growth rate will have been reduced by more than half - from 3.6 percent to 1.5 percent - and life expectancy will have dropped by 20 years – from 60 years to 40 years. Already, life expectancy at birth has dropped from 60 years in 1991 to 43.8 years today. The number of orphans was 82,671 in 2001, half of which are AIDS orphans, and half of which reside in four of the populous northern regions. This number is expected to grow to 251,054 by 2021, of which three-quarters (197,400) will be AIDS orphans. Significant increases in adult and child mortality will result in an altered age structure (a chimney rather than a pyramid) such that a smaller number of young people will be caring for larger numbers of children and old people. (See Table 7.)

The anticipated social and economic impacts of HIV/AIDS in Namibia mirror those around the continent. As elsewhere, the first impacts in Namibia are being felt at the household level and then at the community and wider economic levels. "Declining healthiness" results in reduced productivity, increased health expenditures, reduced savings and reduced human capital investment in terms of skill losses. Rising mortality rates among

concern, it is not an indication of panic as life expectancy at birth is likely to increase again after 2006 or thereabouts, depending on the behavioural responses to the epidemic."

¹⁹ According to the UNDP (2000, 19): "As was observed in the 1999 report, the spread of HIV/AIDS epidemic is increasingly reflected in the data on life expectancy at birth, which had fallen from 58.8 years in the 1995 report to 55.8 in the 1998 report, and further down to 52.4 in the 1999 report. Based on newly available demographic data from GRN, it is estimated that it may have declined further to around 43.0 in 2000. This sharp decline reflects the effects of HIV/AIDS on children, women in their childbearing years and the concentration of the epidemic in the 15-49 age group. It may be pointed out that although this may be cause of

the young adult population will mean a decreased population growth rate, an altered age structure, and a premature loss of well trained, educated and experienced workers. Moreover, as elsewhere in Africa, the majority of HIV/AIDS victims are likely to be the parents of dependent children. Indeed, according to analysis done by SIAPAC, there were an estimated 82,671 orphans in Namibia in 2001. These children often face economic and social discrimination and their growing numbers put tremendous pressure on extended family networks. The infection rate among young women in Namibia is much higher than among young men: among youth aged 15-24 an estimated 19-21 percent of women are infected as opposed to 8-10 percent of men (UNDP, 2000, 12-13).

In his recent visit to Namibia, the United Nations Secretary General's Special Envoy on HIV/AIDS in Africa, Stephen Lewis cited a number of tough challenges facing Namibia as it confronts the AIDS epidemic (*The Namibian*, 28 February 2002, 5). According to Lewis, one major challenge will be to reduce the stigma attached to HIV/AIDS. This will require more open discussion by "opinion makers in the church and government." In addition, Lewis stated that the Ministry of Basic Education, Sports and Culture, as the largest government ministry and the one responsible for more than 1,500 government schools, will face severe challenges. These will include increasing losses in teaching staff, increasing numbers of vulnerable children and orphans, and the need to integrate HIV prevention programs into school curricula. Indeed, a report discussed by senior officials from both education ministries in early March estimated that the cumulative loss of teachers to AIDS between 2002 and 2010 could be up to 20 percent of teaching staff countrywide (The Namibian, 8 March 2002, 3). As the report noted, the schools that are hardest hit tend to be those in the traditionally disadvantaged areas. Other problems include a lack of transport in many government offices and non-governmental organizations dealing with the AIDS crisis and the need to include community members in the design, implementation and monitoring of HIV prevention and care activities (ibid).

Since independence, the Namibian government has responded to the HIV/AIDS crisis with a series of short and medium term plans. In March 1999, a second Medium Term Plan on HIV/AIDS (Medium Term Plan II) was launched, to cover the period 1999 to 2004. The plan is divided into seven strategy areas (social mobilization, prevention, access to service, prevention of discrimination, policy development, program development and

management, and capacity building) and relies upon a wide range of bilateral and multilateral donors (UNDP, 2000, 14-17).

The Social

As noted above, though Namibia has a per capita income that qualifies it for lower middle income country status, this per capita income masks great inequalities of wealth and income among the population. Indeed, the United Nations Development Programme labels Namibia "one of the most unequal societies in the world with a *Gini coefficient*²⁰ of 0.70, in 1996" (UNDP, 2000, 20). In Namibia, according to the UNDP (ibid): "Half the population survives on approximately 10 percent of the average income, while five percent enjoys incomes more than five times the average. The ratio of per capita income between the top five percent and the bottom 50 percent is approximately 50:1. Consequently, any reference to an average income is meaningless when very few have incomes anywhere near the average, and when virtually everyone has either considerably higher, or considerably lower incomes." In Namibia, as the UNDP (ibid) further notes, decades of apartheid rule "produced a system of extreme inequalities, with 55 percent of aggregate income accruing to 10 percent of the population, a small minority of Namibians with social infrastructure in education and health standards equivalent to those of any industrialized country, while the majority of Namibians lead lives, that in most respects resemble those of any other Sub-Saharan African country. As such, in terms of its income and asset distribution, the Namibian economy is so extreme that the 'average' Namibian, in social and economic terms, is a rarity."

These economic and social disparities are evident when one compares data across regions in Namibia.²¹ Indeed, Namibia's 13 administrative regions have a greater significance than simply providing a subnational level of government. A careful depiction of the 13 regions is essential for understanding poverty and development in the country

²⁰ A Gini coefficient of zero means perfect equality, while a coefficient of one means perfect inequality.

²¹ Shortly after independence a Delimitation Commission was established in Namibia with the aim of demarcating new regions in the country – ones that would replace the previous 'ethnic home lands' established by the colonial South African government. The Delimitation Commission also began the process of formally incorporating villages, towns and municipalities in Namibia. Demarcating regions and newly incorporating villages, towns and municipalities was a first step toward local and regional self government. By 1992, 13 administrative regions had been demarcated as follows: in southern Namibia: Hardap and Karas; in central Namibia: Erongo, Khomas, Omaheke, and Otjozondjupa; and in the populous northern Namibia: Caprivi, Kavango, Kunene, Ohangwena, Omusati, Oshana, and Oshikoto. (For the purpose of elections, 95 constituencies were further established within the 13 regions.)

given that, by and large, region serves as a proxy for a host of variables including the usual social indicators, levels of income and wealth, and so on. For example, the bulk (though not all) of historically disadvantaged Namibians (HDNs) live in the northern regions of the Caprivi, Kavango, Ohangwena, Omusati, Oshana, and Oshikoto. Moreover, this is a substantial percentage of the Namibian population: 59.7 percent of Namibians live in those six regions (44.3 percent in Ohangwena, Omusati, Oshana, and Oshikoto). Other regions such as Khomas and Erongo are home to far more advantaged populations, including the majority of white Namibians who enjoy comfortable first world living standards. (Those living in Khomas and Erongo make up just under 20 percent of the population.) (See Table 9.)

In order to better assess poverty levels and lack of development the UNDP has, since 1990, provided alternative measures of human poverty and development through its Human Poverty Index and Human Development Index. The *Human Development Index* (HDI), measures progress in development and has three components: longevity (life expectancy at birth), knowledge (adult literacy rate and school enrolment rate), and access to resources (per capita income). The *Human Poverty Index* (HPI) indicates deprivation, in other words, of the additional development that is required to eradicate poverty. The HPI is measured by the proportion of the population deprived of certain elements of human life considered essential for human development, such as: longevity (those not expected to survive to age 40), knowledge (those adults not literate), and a decent standard of living (no access to safe water, no access to health facilities, malnourished children). For a Namibian Human Poverty Index, HPI-N, a fourth element has been added: the proportion of households that have less than 20 percent of their income available for non-food items. According to the UNDP (2000, 23): "When the overall financial situation of a household is such that the mere survival of its members lays claim to most of the household income, the family suffers deprivation. It is deprived of control over its own material resources and, in particular, of the option to save and invest as a way to improve its own situation."

The *Namibia Human Development Report* provides HDI and HPI data for Namibia disaggregated by region, urban versus rural location, gender, and language group. In so doing, the *Namibia Human Development Report* illustrates the aforementioned massive inequalities in wealth and development in the country and indicates the challenges still facing Namibia as it seeks to undo the legacies of colonialism and apartheid. The Human

Development Indices for Namibia (see Table 10) reveal a dismal picture with respect to life expectancy with a regional low of 32.6 years in Caprivi and a regional high of only 47.2 years for Erongo in 2000. The national average of 44.9 years for 1999 is below that of the average for Sub-Saharan Africa, other developing countries, less developed countries and the Arab world, Asia or Latin America in 1999. In 2000 Namibia's national average drops to 43 years. The low life expectancy figure reflects the fact that Namibia is one of the most severely HIV infected countries in the world.

Adult literacy rates, by contrast, are generally high in Erongo, Karas, and Khomas and "surprisingly high," according to the UNDP (2000, 27), in the northern regions of Omusati, Oshikoto, and Oshana (82 to 85 percent). This, apparently, reflects "the post-independence increase in school enrollment across all regions." Indeed, school enrollments (of children aged 7 to 18) are relatively high in all regions except Otjozondjupa, Khomas, and Omaheke. The UNDP posits that in those regions the relatively high concentrations of San people may bring down the school enrollment figures (ibid). Moreover, Namibia spends a high percentage of its national budget on education. In the recently tabled National Budget for 2002-03, 21.5 percent of the total budget was allocated to Education Affairs and Services. The Census for 2001 reveals that over 90% of Namibian women and almost 90% of Namibian men have now had some formal schooling, and 50% have attended some period of secondary school. Overall, Namibia's 1999 national adult literacy rate of 81.4 percent compares quite favorably with other parts of the developing world, only slightly outdone by East Asia and Latin America.

Per capita income figures, again, show the enormous disparities of wealth and income in Namibia, with a high of N\$ 11,359 in the Khomas region compared to lows of N\$ 1,070 in Ohangwena and N\$ 1,452 in Omusati, two of the historically disadvantaged northern regions.²² Per capita figures in US dollars, even adjusted to reflect purchasing power parity, show just how deceptive the national averages can be. In 1999 such a Namibian average compared quite favorably with other regions of the developing world: Namibia's national purchasing power parity average of US\$ 5,468 was better (in most cases,

-

²² These income figures are Average Adjusted Per Capita Income figures taken from the *1993/94 Namibia Household Income and Expenditure Survey*. The per capita income figures are adjusted to reflect the age composition of members of the household, the assumption being that younger members of a household consume less. The figures are still relevant for purposes of comparison across regions.

much better) than all other regions except for Latin America and the Caribbean (also a deceptive figure that masks enormous inequalities). (See Table 11.)

Figures for the overall HDI are also illuminating. The UNDP actually categorizes countries according to their HDI score. High human development countries are in the 0.80 to 1.0 range, medium human development countries in the 0.50 to 0.79 range, and low human development countries are in the 0.0 to 0.49 range. Since 1996, Namibia's global HDI score has ranged from 0.573 in 1996 to 0.632 in 2000, placing Namibia at the lower end of the medium human development category. Namibia's national HDI scores over the same period have been somewhat higher, ranging from 0.734 in 1996 to 0.648 in 2000. ²³ In both cases, the HDI has fallen over the past five years (after peaking in 1998), again, a reflection of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Namibia. The national HDI scores, disaggregated at the regional level, also reveal a downward trend over the last few years with scores varying greatly within the medium human development range: Khomas had the highest score of 0.769 placing that region nearly in the high human development category while Caprivi had the lowest at 0.513 in 2000 placing it at the very bottom of the medium human development category. The scores disaggregated by language group are far more revealing. Europeans in Namibia – Afrikaans, English, and German speakers – fall well within the high human development category, while another group, the San, fall well within the low human development category. Remaining groups are, like Namibia as a whole, within the medium human development category. As the UNDP (2000, 32) notes: "Speakers of indigenous African languages are relatively deprived..." with the San "clearly the most marginalized and deprived group."

The Human Poverty Indices for Namibia (see Table 12) also show a grim picture, especially for some regions and some language groups. For example, in the Caprivi, nearly 54 percent of the population will not survive to 40 years; in Kavango and Oshikoto nearly 40 percent of the population will not survive to 40 years. By contrast, in Erongo and

_

²³ The UNDP (2000, 21) explains the difference between the global and national HDIs as follows: "Though the same indicators have been used for the Namibian National Index as for the global one, the National HDI is not directly comparable to the global HDI. The global HDI is calculated in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) in US dollars, adjusted to an international average to ensure the international comparability of figures. The Namibian HDI (above) uses Namibian dollars, adjusted to the national average in order to facilitate its comparability over time, and among the regions and groups within Namibia. Hence the figures for Namibia for 1999 differ slightly." The global HDI for Namibia in 1997 was 0.570, in 1998 it was 0.644, and in 1999 it was 0.638. This contrasts with national HDIs of 0.7441 in 1997, 0.7701 in 1998, and 0.683 in 1999. UNDP, 2000, 20.

Khomas only about 25 percent of the population will not reach the age of 40. For Namibia as a whole, 33 percent of the population will not reach 40 years. A number of the other indices show the glaring inequalities within Namibian society as well. In most of the country, except for Erongo and Khomas, nearly 40 percent of the population, or well more (89 percent in the case of Omaheke), has no access to health facilities. Similarly, while almost no one in Erongo, Karas, or Khomas lacks for safe drinking water, in many other regions of the country significant portions of the population (up to 45 percent in Ohangwena) have no access to safe water. The same inequalities are evident in household income spent on food, with 20 and 25 percent of people in Omaheke and Omusati, respectively, spending more than 80 percent of their income on food as compared with only one percent in Khomas. (See Table 12.)

As the UNDP (2000, 28) points out, the data reveal the existence of a "southern [central] cluster," with Erongo and Khomas as "significantly better off than any other region." Indeed, the Khomas region "has not only three times the national average income level, it also has higher levels of education and health services. It is dominated by the capital Windhoek, wherein government employs some 72,000 civil servants, or one in eleven of the labor force. A large proportion of these civil servants, who are well paid by national and regional standards, live and work in Windhoek." Among the northern regions, "Ohangwena and Caprivi stand out as the poorest, followed closely, and somewhat surprisingly, by the relatively well developed Omaheke. Although this region is relatively high on the income scale, reflecting its relatively prosperous farming residents, the majority of the population fall within the northern cluster of poor regions, as Omaheke is home to many communities with inadequate access to social services, especially health services."

All of these inequalities are even more stark when the language groups are compared. The San, Rukavango and Caprivi/Lozi fare markedly worse than others groups, especially the European groups, in every indicator. As the UNDP (2000, 30) observes: "The European communities live in a world of their own with less than 10 percent poverty, while the San live at the other extreme with 60 percent poverty. In between are five groups representing some 90 percent of the Namibian population, all with similar poverty rates of between 20 and 30 percent." Regionally, the UN HDI reports severe poverty rates as ranging from 10% in Khomas up to 32% in Ohangwena, or 20% nationally. (2002 Orphans Survey)

When Namibia's global human poverty indices are compared to those of other countries in Southern Africa the country falls in the middle range, not as badly off as countries such as Mozambique or Malawi, but not as well off as Lesotho or South Africa (whose aggregate data are also misleading for the same reasons as in Namibia). (See Table 13.)

The data provided by the UNDP poverty and development indices show considerable discrepancies between men and women in Namibia with regard to important social and economic indicators. This despite the fact that with independence in Namibia concerted efforts have been undertaken to improve the social, political and economic position of Namibian women. The Namibian constitution makes special reference to women and their concerns in an independent Namibia mandating, for example, that all persons shall be equal before the law and no persons shall be discriminated against on the grounds of sex, race, color, ethnic origin, religion, creed or social or economic status. Moreover, the constitution also states that, in the enactment of affirmative action legislation, it will be permissible to note that women in Namibia have traditionally suffered special discrimination and need to be encouraged and enabled to play a full, equal and effective role in the political, social economic and cultural life of the nation.

In a relatively short period, considerable progress has been made, at least in the area of legal institutions and law reform. For example, in August 1990 a Department of Women Affairs was established within the Office of the President. The DWA played a key role in bringing gender issues onto the national agenda, facilitating communication between women and the government, and helping to identify priority areas for action on issues related to women. In 2000, the DWA was upgraded to a Ministry of Women Affairs and Child Welfare. In 1992, a Law Reform and Development Commission (LRDC) was established to oversee the bringing of new and existing laws into compliance with the Namibian constitution. The LRDC established a Women and Law Committee (WLC) to focus attention on the need to eliminate gender-related legal disparities between women and men in Namibia. Also in 1992, the Namibian Parliament ratified the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1995, the Legal Practitioners Act was passed; the act aims at promoting greater access to the legal profession and to legal representation for all sectors of society.

In 1997, following the recommendations of the Fourth United Nations World Conference on Women, a National Gender Policy (NGP) was launched by government (and finally adopted by Parliament in 1999). The NGP aims, ultimately, to end all forms of gender discrimination. It addresses 10 critical areas of concern identified in the Beijing Platform of Action, including gender and economic empowerment, the girl child, and gender and legal affairs. The policy provides for the creation of monitoring mechanisms to oversee its implementation. These include a Gender Commission, Gender Focal Points, a Gender Sectoral Committee, and a Gender Network Coordinating Committee. The National Gender Policy was complemented by a Plan of Action in 1998, which aims at translating policy into action.

Another goal of legal scholars and women activists in Namibia has been to facilitate the election of more women to political office. Since independence, considerable progress has been on this front as well. In 2001, women make up 40 percent of local councilors in local authorities, and 25 percent of Members of Parliament in the National Assembly. By contrast, only four percent of regional councilors are women and, as a result, only two members out of 26 in the National Council are women. This relatively high percentage of women elected to political office at the local level and to the National Assembly can be attributed to the type of electoral mechanism used and to the use of electoral quotas. In Namibia, for local council and National Assembly elections to date, the choice of electoral system has been a closed list proportional representation (PR) system. In regional council elections in Namibia, by contrast, where women have fared very poorly, the plurality or winner-take-all method is utilized.

In Namibia, quotas are required by law in local elections. The Local Authorities Act of 1992, amended and strengthened in 1997, mandates that approximately 30 percent of candidates in local authorities elections be women, although the law does not specify what positions must be given to women on party lists. (The Directorate of Elections, however, has recommended that parties arrange their lists in a 'zebra manner,' meaning that women be dispersed throughout the list). Political parties in Namibia have largely complied with this voluntary request, as is evident by the fact that significant numbers of women have been elected at the local level. For the regional and national levels in Namibia, however, no such laws exist. This resulted in the drafting in 1999 of a *Women's Manifesto* by a network of non-governmental and women's organizations. Among other things, the Women's

Manifesto demands that 50 percent of candidates in national elections be women. During the 1999 National Assembly elections, political parties largely complied with this call for voluntary electoral quotas, with the result that more women were elected to the National Assembly.

While women are making some strides in the formal political arena, this is less true in the economic arena. Income data from the *National Gender Survey* show large discrepancies in wages and salaries between men and women in Namibia. In the best cases, women earn about 60 percent of what men do, in the worst cases less than 50 percent. Tables 14 and 15 show income through wages and salaries for men and women in the five Namibian regions earning the highest such incomes and the five Namibian regions earning the lowest such incomes.

The Gender-related Human Development Index (GDI) further illustrates the plight of women in Namibia. The GDI is one of two measures introduced by the UNDP in 1995 to further evaluate the quality of human development in a country. The GDI "uses the same variables as the Human Development Index but adjusts the average achievement of each country in terms of life expectancy, educational level and income according to the disparity in the achievements of women and of men. The greater the disparity between women and men, the lower the value of the Gender-related Human Development Index relative to the Human Development Index." Such national level indices or measures are, again, problematic in the Namibian case, because they mask the large discrepancies among the different population groups in the country. In Southern Africa in 1999, Namibia had the best GDI score, after South Africa, and was ranked 100th out of 146 countries (UNDP, 2001, 212-213). In recent years, according to the Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies (SARIPS), the GDI has fallen for most Southern African countries. This is because of "a fall in all components [life expectancy, combined gross enrolment ratio, adult literacy and GDP in US dollar purchasing power parity per capita by gender] except income" (SARIPS, 72). (See Table 16.)

It is important to note the social investments that Namibia has made in its people. As a share of total public spending, expenditures on education are not at approximately 23 percent, after reaching an all time high of 26.5 percent in 1997/98. Measured as a proportion of GNP, Namibia spends more on education than any other country included in the World Bank's report on "World Development Indicators." The UNDP's 2001 human

development report ranks Namibia second in the world with regard to public expenditure on education (as a 9.1% of GNP), based on 1991-1997 numbers. By way of pre-independence comparison, Namibia ranked 139th in the period 1985-1987 (less than 0.5% of GNP). The 2001 UNDP Human Development report also shows Namibia with the highest public sector health expenditure in Africa, as a percentage of GDP (4.1%).

Continued Donor Assistance to Namibia

Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Namibia has fallen considerably in the last few years, from US\$ 180 million in 1998 to US\$ 152 million in 2000. In 1999, Namibia received US\$ 177.6 million in net ODA, for a per capita ODA of US\$ 104.4. In Southern Africa, only Zambia receives development assistance at anywhere near the per capita level of Namibia (US\$ 63.1). See Table 17. (In 2000, per capita ODA to Namibia was about US\$ 92.9.) The top five donors of gross ODA to Namibia in 1999-2000 were the European Community²⁴ (US\$ 48m), Germany (US\$ 37m), Sweden (US\$ 15m), the United States (US\$ 12m), and Finland (US\$ 7m) (www1.oecd.org).

A number of compelling arguments can be made for continued donor assistance to Namibia. On the political front, Namibia has experienced numerous successes over the last 12 years, developments that should be reinforced and supported by the donor community. Namibia has successfully completed a democratic transition, no small feat on a continent where many attempted transitions have stalled, failed or been reversed. The country is politically stable and the rule of law prevails. Namibia has held seven free and (for the most part) fair elections, all but the first under its own auspices. Namibia's democratic constitution is largely respected and the country has a mature legislature and an independent judiciary. Namibian President Sam Nujoma has vowed not to seek a fourth term in elections during 2004.

²⁴ During 2001-07 Namibia will continue to receive significant development assistance from the European Community under a new national indicative programme (NIP); the aid will be less, however, than Namibia received during the first indicative programme, 1990-2000. According to the EIU (26): "A European Commission (EC) strategy paper published in support of the new NIP noted that although Namibia is one of the more politically stable countries in Africa, there is growing concern about its involvement in external conflict, particularly the Angolan civil war. The paper also raises concerns over recent pronouncements by government members against minority groups, criticism of the judiciary and foreigners, and a ban on government purchases and advertisements in the independent daily newspaper, The Namibian. Despite typically cautious terminology, the strategy paper hints at EC concern over the possibility of a more aggressive Zimbabwe-style land redistribution strategy being introduced in future, stating that the important issue of land tenure has "gained sensitivity" in the past two years. Although the EC has not proposed direct funding of land redistribution, rural development assistance will include provision for financing community-farming projects in northern Namibia."

At the same time, Namibia still confronts the difficult task of consolidating its nascent democracy, a task which must be reinforced rather than undercut. The advent of a new political party in 1999, with no ties to any pre-independence governments, is the most promising development yet toward the institutionalization of a strong multiparty political system in Namibia. The Congress of Democrats is working hard toward winning 30 percent of the vote in the 2004 election. If the COD were to come close to this target, then Namibia would provide an example of a multiparty political system in a way that even democratic Botswana and South Africa (both one party dominant states) do not. The 2004 election is further crucial because it will mark the ascension to power of a new President. The next two years will be especially important for Namibia as the ruling party SWAPO confronts the difficult challenge of a succession struggle after being led by founding member Sam Nujoma for more than four decades. Again, assuming that the succession struggle is amicably resolved, then Namibia will serve as an important regional example and counter to Zimbabwe on the question of the passing of the first generation of independence leaders. At the same time, both of these processes, the institutionalization of a multiparty political system and the succession struggle, could go badly awry. Moreover, as the data from the Afrobarometer reveal, democracy is not yet "the only game in town" for all Namibians (though it is for most). Thus some work remains to be done in the area of civic education. Indeed, there is still room for political capacity building in Namibia; the country is still developing a democratic, tolerant and activist political culture.

Namibia is also critical to the donor community because of its political influence and role in Southern Africa and the continent as a whole. Because of its 'liberation history,' the government of Namibia has strong ties to governments in non-democratic countries in the region such as Angola and Zimbabwe, as well as democratic governments in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, ties that are important to donor country governments. Because of these ties, for example, Namibia can play a facilitating role in resolving the continuing conflicts in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Moreover, Namibia will be an important player, as well as useful conduit, in the reconstruction and development of Angola.

Namibia is also emerging as a key player in the Southern African Development Community. Namibians have served as the Chairman of SADC and the Chairman of the SADC Council of Ministers. During that time, significant changes and improvements to the institutional framework of SADC were implemented and there was a restructuring of the organization into new program areas. A Namibian was also the first chair of the SADC Electoral Forum, a clear recognition of Namibia's exemplary electoral record over the last decade. Indeed, many African countries have looked to Namibia for assistance in the area of electoral reform and the conducting of elections. In addition, the SADC Parliamentary Forum is located in Windhoek, adjacent to chambers of the Namibian Parliament. Moreover, a proposal has been mooted to move the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Center to Namibia from Zimbabwe. Namibia has been recognized in a number of other instances as the most appropriate place for organization head offices. For example, there are strong indications that the headquarters of the South African Customs Union will be moved from South Africa to Namibia. Recently, the secretariat of the African Mayors Initiative on HIV/AIDS was inaugurated in Windhoek and the United Nations Habitat [for Humanity] Research and Development Centre will be established in Katutura in the not too distant future.

There are economic reasons for continued donor assistance to Namibia as well. Since independence Namibia has followed a set of pragmatic liberal economic policies. Presumably, members of the donor community would like to see Namibia continue to follow such policies. Though Namibia has achieved moderate levels of economic growth, these have been offset by a high population growth rate. Unemployment remains a major challenge for Namibia at the same time that the country also faces shortages of highly skilled labor. Still, the government has increased levels of spending in education, health and other social services with some positive results. In addition, in its attempt to diversify the economy, the government has been relatively successful in attracting foreign investment to Namibia, in particular, to those areas designated as export processing zones. Moreover, there are important future economic developments in the offing. Government revenues could rise dramatically once the Kudu gas fields are brought into operation and if the American oil company Vanco does indeed find oil off Namibia's coast as is anticipated. These and other developments (e.g. the construction of three large textile factories) suggest that the Port of Walvis Bay is poised to become one of the more important ports in Africa. Indeed there are many who consider that Namibia, through its excellent port facilities at Walvis Bay, can become the 'gateway to SADC.' This is being further underscored by the establishment of a direct shipping line from Walvis Bay to the United States.

Some economic problems that plague other countries are not yet of epic proportions in Namibia. While there does seem to be a rise in corruption in the public and private sectors in Namibia, the country remains one of the very 'cleanest' in Africa – and when misappropriation of funds occurs, it is generally dealt with. Also, while the land issue must still be addressed in Namibia, it has not taken on the political significance that it has in Zimbabwe. While the issue could still be manipulated for political gain, Namibia's handling of land reform is, again, an important counterexample to Zimbabwe's. So far, Namibia has also managed to avoid a large external debt.

Because of its excellent infrastructure and functioning institutions, Namibia is the envy of many African countries. Indeed, many governments (and people) from around Africa have turned to Namibia for assistance. The governments of Angola, Malawi and Zambia have all consulted with Namibia's National Planning Commission on how to conduct an effective census. The Malawian national television has sent its journalists to Namibia to be trained by the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation. And, uniquely, many train locomotives from around Africa (for example, from Tanzania) are serviced in Namibia or by Namibians. As noted earlier, many African countries look to Namibia as an example in electoral matters.

It is in the social realm that continued support from external donors is probably the most urgent. Indeed, it would be morally indefensible for donors to abandon Namibia in the throes of one of the worst AIDS crises in the world. The potential negative economic and social effects of the epidemic are staggering and must be fought at every turn. In addition, the poverty and development issues outlined above must be addressed. Many, if not most, Namibians continue to feel the legacy of apartheid and colonialism. This legacy of neglect, deprivation and inequality will not be undone in a few years, but will require many years of consistent support. At the same time, Namibia has made some progress in redressing gender inequality in society. A number of significant laws have been passed in an attempt to improve the position of women in Namibia and the country is among the leaders worldwide in terms of the number of women in the national legislature and at the local level of government.

Donor assistance should be about building capacity and sustainability. In Namibia the political, economic and social foundations exist and must now simply be built upon.

Namibia is a small country with a small economy and a readily accessible elite. As such

even moderate infusions of donor assistance can have a large impact. Without such assistance, donors will relinquish a considerable amount of leverage to influence a series of important developments in Namibia in the near future and beyond.

References

Economist Intelligence Unit. 2002. *Namibia Swaziland Country Report February* 2002. London: EIU. www.eiu.com

Freedom House. 2001. *Press Freedom Survey 2000*. Washington, DC: Freedom House. www.freedomhouse.org

Freedom House. 2002. *Freedom in the World 2001-2002*. Washington, DC: Freedom House. www.freedomhouse.org

Gwartney, James, and Robert Lawson. 2001. *Economic Freedom of the World: 2001 Annual Report*. Vancouver BC: Fraser Institute. www.fraserinsitute.ca

Heritage Foundation and *Wall Street Journal*. 2002. *The 2002 Index of Economic Freedom*. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation. www.heritage.org

Iipinge, E.M., F.A. Phiri, A.F. Njabili, eds. 2000. *The National Gender Study*. Volume I. Windhoek: University of Namibia.

Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). 2000. Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic June 2000. Geneva: UNAIDS.

Keulder, Christiaan. 1999. *Voting Behaviour in Namibia II – Regional Councils 1998*. Windhoek: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Keulder, Christiaan. 2002. Public Opinion and the Consolidation of Democracy in Namibia. *Afrobarometer Paper No. 15*. Cape Town: IDASA.

Mattes, Robert, Michael Bratton, Yul Derek Davids, and Cherrel Africa. 2000. Public Opinion and the Consolidation of Democracy in Southern Africa. *Afrobarometer Paper No.* 7. Cape Town: IDASA.

Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA). 2000. So This is Democracy? State of the Media in Southern Africa. Windhoek: MISA.

Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU). 2001a. *Namibia Economic Review and Prospects* 2000/2001. Windhoek: NEPRU. www.nepru.org.na

Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU). 2001b. *NEPRU Quarterly Economic Review*. No. 42. Windhoek: NEPRU. www.nepru.org.na

The Namibian. Various Issues. Windhoek.

National Planning Commission. 1998. *Poverty Reduction Strategy for Namibia*. Windhoek: NPC. Republic of Namibia.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the African Development Bank (OECD/BAD). 2002. *African Economic Outlook*. Paris: OECD.

Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies (SARIPS). 2000. SADC Regional Human Development Report 2000. Harare: SAPES Books.

Transparency International. 2001. *Global Corruption Report 2001*. Berlin: Transparency International. www.globalcorruptionreport.org

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 1998. *Namibia Human Development Report 1998*. Windhoek: UNDP.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2000. *Namibia Human Development Report 2000*. Windhoek: UNDP.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2001. *Human Development Report* 2001. New York: Oxford University Press.

United States Department of State. 2002. *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2001*– *Namibia*. Washington, DC: US Department of State. www.state.gov

World Economic Forum. 2001. *Africa Competitiveness Report 2000-2001*. Geneva: World Economic Forum. www.worldeconomicforum.org

World Bank. 2000. 2000 World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Interviews

- 1. 1 March 2002, Luckson Chipare, Regional Director, Media Institute of Southern Africa.
- 2. 11 March 2002, Hanno Rumpf, Permanent Secretary, National Planning Commission.
- 3. 12 March 2002, Joseph Cassidy, Political Officer, Embassy of the United States of America.
- 4. 15 March 2002, Andre du Pisani, Political Scientist, University of Namibia.
- 5. 26 March 2002, Dirk Hansohm, Director, Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit.
- 6. 2 April 2002, Gerhard Toetemeyer, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing.
- 7. 3 April 2002, Willem Aalmans, Charge d'Affairs, Embassy of the Netherlands.

Appendix

Table 1. Freedom House Ratings of African Countries, 2001-2002.

FREE	PR	CL	PARTLY	PR	CL	NOT	PR	CL
			FREE			FREE		
Cape Verde	1	2	Madagascar	2	4	Algeria	6	5
Mauritius	1	2	Malawi	4	3	Chad	6	5
Sao Tome and	1	2	Seychelles	3	3	Egypt	6	6
Principe								
South Africa	1	2	CAR	5	5	Guinea	6	5
Benin	3	2	Mozambique	3	4	Kenya	6	5
Botswana	2	2	Senegal	3	4	Swaziland	6	5
Ghana	2	3	Burkina Faso	4	4	Tunisia	6	5
Mali	2	3	Lesotho	4	4	Angola	6	6
Namibia	2	3	Niger	4	4	Burundi	6	6
			Nigeria	4	5	Eritrea	7	6
			Tanzania	4	4	Liberia	6	6
			Djibouti	4	5	Zimbabwe	6	6
			Gabon	5	4	Cameroon	6	6
			Guinea	4	5	DRC	6	6
			Bissau					
			Morocco	5	5	Rwanda	7	6
			Sierra Leone	4	5	Somalia	6	7
			Zambia	5	4	Equatorial	6	7
						Guinea		
			Comoros	6	4	Libya	7	7
			Congo	5	4	Sudan	7	7
			(Brazzaville)					
			Ethiopia	5	5			
			The Gambia	5	5			
			Mauritania	5	5			
			Togo	5	5			
			Cote d'Ivoire	5	4			
		1002 G	Uganda	6	5			

Source: Freedom House, 2002. Countries are listed according to their combined average rating of two comparative measures of freedom: PR (political rights) and CL (civil liberties). 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free. Bolded country names indicate SADC membership.

Table 2. Election Results in Namibia by Party: 1989-1999 (in percentages).

	Nov 1989	Dec 1992	Dec 1992	Dec 1994	Feb 1998	Dec 1998	Dec 1999
	Constit	Local	Regional	National	Local	Regional	National
	Assembly	Authorities	Councils	Assembly	Authorities	Councils	Assembly
Voter	98.05	82.33	81.07	76.05	33.75	40.01	62.00
Turnout							
SWAPO	56.90	58.02	68.76	73.89	60.35	67.92	76.30
DTA	28.34	33.26	27.68	20.78	23.91	23.91	9.40
COD							9.90
UDF	5.60	5.88	2.49	2.72	6.66	4.45	2.90
FCN	1.55			0.24		0.17	0.10
DCN	5.09	0.06	0.20	0.83	0.53		0.30

NPF CAN						
SWANU (NNF)	0.79	1.49	0.72	0.53	0.23	 0.30
MAG				0.82		 0.70
Residents					8.22	
Assocs						

Sources: **1989-1998**: Keulder, 1999, 61. **1999**: *The Namibian*, 7 December 1999, 9 December 1999.

Totals do not sum to 100 percent due to spoilt ballots and trace percentages to smaller parties.

Table 3. Number of Action Alerts by Country in Southern Africa, 2000.

Angola	24
Botswana	5
Lesotho	2
Malawi	16
Mozambique	5
Namibia	18
South Africa	5
Swaziland	18
Tanzania	12
Zambia	31
Zimbabwe	46

Source: MISA, 201.

Table 4. Selected Economic Indicators for Namibia, 1993-1999.

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
GDP in million N\$	9302	11549	12707	15012	16795	18887	21124
GDP per capita in N\$	6205	7470	7972	9137	9902	10792	11703
GDP growth rate (real)*		7.3	4.1	3.2	4.5	3.5	3.8
Increase in GDP per	-4.7	4.1	1.0	0.1	1.2	0.3	0.7
capita							
Exports as % of GDP	51.9	48.5	49.5	50.6	47.4	45.8	46.8
Imports as % of GDP	56.7	51.3	55.7	58.6	57.4	57.7	58.4
Govt expend as % GDP	31.6	28.3	30.0	30.1	29.9	29.3	29.3
Budget deficit as % GDP	3.6	1.8	3.9	6.5	2.9	3.9	4.6
Yearly inflation rate	8.6	10.8	8.9	9.1	8.8	6.2	8.6
(CPI)							
Aid per capita US\$	93	83	95	106	98	109	118
Aid as % GDP	4.5	3.6	4.5	5.0	4.6	5.5	6.6

Source: UNDP, 2000, 158. According to EIU (2002, 6) the real GDP growth rate percentages from 1997 to 2001 were as follows: 4.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.3, and 3.0.

Table 5. Government Consumption Expenditure in % of Total Expenditure, 1993-2000.

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
General Public Services	20.8	18.7	21.9	18.1	18.3	19.8	19.4	16.4
Defence Affairs and Services	6.4	6.8	6.1	7.9	8.0	7.5	7.6	7.6
Public Order and Safety Affairs	7.8	8.4	7.8	7.3	8.9	8.2	8.2	9.3
Education Affairs and Services	27.9	28.1	26.0	30.5	28.7	27.2	27.5	23.5
Health Affairs and Services	11.1	11.6	11.5	11.0	11.2	11.3	11.4	11.4
Social Security and Welfare Affairs and Services	1.1	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5
Housing and Community Amenity Affairs and Services	6.7	6.5	5.1	5.6	5.4	5.1	5.0	6.6
Recreation, Cultural and Religious Affairs Services	1.1	1.0	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	2.5
Agricultural, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting Affairs Services	4.5	6.8	6.8	6.9	6.6	7.3	7.3	6.6
Transportation and Communication Affairs and Services	7.6	6.9	7.0	5.4	5.7	5.0	5.0	2.5
Other Economic Affairs and Services	1.3	1.0	2.2	1.5	1.7	3.0	2.9	3.0
Central Government	96.4	96.2	96.5	96.5	96.5	96.2	96.2	95.9
Local Government	3.6	3.8	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.8	3.8	4.1
General Government	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: UNDP, 2000, 163.

Table 6. Trends in Economic Performance, SADC Countries.

SADC		GNP	GNP ann	ual	GNP	GNP pe	r capita	Average a	nnual
HDI		(US\$	growth ra	ate (%)	per	annual growth		rate of inflation	
		bn)			capita	rate (%	<u>,</u>)	(%)	
					(US\$)				
Rank	Country	1998	1975-95	1990-98	1998	1975-90	1990-98	1990-98	1998
1	Seychelles	0.5	4.7	2.9	6,420	3.5	1.4	1.4	2.0
2	Mauritius	4.3	5.5	5.2	3,730	4.3	4.0	6.2	5.6
3	South Africa	136.9	1.7	1.7	3,310	-0.7	-0.4	10.6	7.9
4	Swaziland	1.4	6.0	3.0	1,400	2.7	-0.2	12.4	8.5
5	Namibia	3.2	••	3.8	1,940	••	1.1	9.5	11.4
6	Botswana	4.8	12.3	3.9	3,070	8.5	1.4	10.3	7.9
7	Lesotho	1.2	4.6	3.2	570	2.0	0.9	7.7	3.7
8	Zimbabwe	7.2	3.0	1.8	620	-0.2	-0.5	21.9	29.8
9	DR Congo	5.4	-0.2	-5.3	110	-3.3	-8.3	1,423.1	15.0
10	Zambia	3.2	0.6	1.4	330	-2.5	-1.3	63.5	23.2
11	Tanzania	7.2		3.4	220		0.4	24.3	17.3
12	Angola	4.6		-3.3	380		-6.4	924.3	60.9
13	Malawi	2.2	2.8	3.6	210	-0.5	0.9	33.2	23.2
14	Mozambique	3.5		5.8	210		3.5	41.1	3.8
	SADC	185.6	338.8	1.7	944.3	-1.0	-2.2	444.1	17.1

Source: SARIPS, 255.

Table 7. Demographic Impact of HIV/AIDS in Namibia, 1991-2006.

Indicator	1991	1995	2001	2006
Annual Number of Deaths from AIDS	360	1,440	13,880	23,220
Crude Death Rate	11.4	11.2	16	18.8
Total Population (millions)	1.1	1.6	1.9	2.1
Population Growth Rate (%)	3.6	3.1	2.1	1.5
Life Expectancy at Birth	60	58.3	43.8	40.2
Infant Mortality Rate	71.6	71.5	70.1	62.9
Under Five Years Mortality Rate (/1000)	104	98	106.2	100.9
Orphans Due to AIDS (< 15 years)	50	1,630	31,290	118,050

Source: UNDP, 2000, 12 [Ministry of Health and Social Services, October 2000].

Table 8. HIV/AIDS Estimates for Southern Africa, SSA, and the World, 1999.

	People Living	g with AIDS, er	nd 1999	Deaths 1999	Orphans
	Adult	Adults	Children	Adults and	Cumulative
	Rate (%)	(15-49)	(0-14)	Children	Number
Namibia	19.54	150,000	6,600	18,000	67,000
Angola	2.78	150,000	7,900	15,000	98,000
Botswana	35.8	280,000	10,000	24,000	66,000
Lesotho	23.57	240,000	8,200	16,000	35,000
Malawi	15.96	760,000	40,000	70,000	390,000
Mozambique	13.22	1,100,000	52,000	98,000	310,000
South Africa	19.94	4,100,000	95,000	250,000	420,000
Swaziland	25.25	120,000	3,800	7,100	12,000
Zambia	19.95	830,000	40,000	99,000	650,000
Zimbabwe	25.06	1,400,000	56,000	160,000	900,000
SSA	8.57	23,400,000	1,000,000	2,200,000	12,100,000
The World	1.07	33,000,000	1,300,000	2,800,000	13,200,000

Source: UNAIDS, 124.

Table 9. Total Population by Region, 2001 Census.

Region	Total Population	Percentage
Caprivi	79 852	4.4
Erongo	107 629	5.9
Hardap	67 998	3.7
Karas	69 677	3.8
Kavango	201 093	11.0
Khomas	250 305	13.7
Kunene	68 224	3.7
Ohangwena	227 728	12.5
Omaheke	67 496	3.7
Omusati	228 364	12.5
Oshana	191 977	10.5
Oshikoto	160 690	8.8
Otjozondjupa	135 723	7.4
Total Country	1 826 854	100

Source: www.grnnet.gov.na/News/Archive/2002/March/Week2/census.

Table 10. Human Development Index (HDI) for Namibia, 2000.

2000 Human	Developn	nent Indic	es for Namib	oia	,			
Region	Life	Adult	School	Income	Adjusted	HDI	HDI	HDI
	Expect	Literacy	Enrolment	N\$*	Income**	2000	1999	1998
Caprivi	32.6	75.4	95.3	1,598	3,773	0.517	0.541	0.538
Erongo	47.2	88.5	89.7	5,423	4,339	0.713	0.754	0.810
Hardap	41.6	80.7	85.8	5,945	4.446	0.667	0.706	0.822
Karas	42.0	88.6	89.5	6,655	4,505	0.700	0.734	0.787
Khomas	46.1	94.0	83.7	11,359	4,777	0.769	0.821	0.853
Kunene	45.5	64.3	94.9	2,203	3,939	0.588	0.616	0.608
Ohangwena	43.0	76.0	93.7	1,070	3,569	0.544	0.582	0.546
Kavango	40.3	73.1	96.7	1,763	3,762	0.554	0.584	0.569
Omaheke	44.1	64.0	79.0	3,944	4,236	0.605	0.644	0.706
Omusati	42.6	82.5	99.3	1,452	3,725	0.585	0.624	0.614
Oshana	43.5	85.4	99.5	1,922	3,869	0.618	0.659	0.648
Oshikoto	40.3	81.9	94.1	1,680	4,322	0.654	0.686	0.604
Otjozondjupa	41.1	72.0	79.4	3,659	4,198	0.601	0.636	0.735
Namibia	43.0	81.0	94.5	3,608	4,190	0.648	0.683	0.770
Urban	46.4	91.7	96.2	7,651	4,575	0.749	0.787	0.808
Rural	41.7	73.7	93.7	1,875	3,856	0.574	0.608	0.601
Female	45.6	79.6	95.3	2,188	3,935	0.622	0.660	0.653
Male	40.6	82.6	93.5	4,454	4,299	0.653	0.685	0.767

Language	Life	Adult	School	Income		HDI	HDI	HDI
Group	Expect	Literacy	Enrolment	N\$	Adjusted	2000	1999	1998
					Income*			
Afrikaans	67.2	96.1	87.4	13,995	4,884	0.885	0.887	0.865
Caprivi/	56.6	79.9	89.0	1,692	3,803	0.613	0.640	0.579
English	66.9	98.6	89.9	1,708	5,108	0.895	0.926	0.873
German	75.0	99.4	92.2	30,459	5,283	0.960	1.000	0.930
Nama/	58.6	71.1	74.7	2,404	3,983	0.611	0.642	0.618
Oshiwambo	61.3	82.8	88.9	1,707	3,807	0.641	0.673	0.613
Otjiherero	64.1	72.3	75.7	3,077	4,162	0.667	0.702	0.711
Rukavango	55.9	72.8	83.0	1,652	3,791	0.585	0.613	0.550
San	48.1	16.0	18.3	1,315	3,674	0.326	0.359	0.279
Tswana	61.7	81.0	85.7	5,326	4,390	0.721	0.751	0.782

Source: UNDP, 2000, 156. *These income figures are Average Adjusted Per Capita Income figures taken from the 1993/94 Namibia Household Income and Expenditure Survey. The per capita income figures are adjusted to reflect the age composition of members of the household, the assumption being that younger members of a household consume less. The figures are still relevant for purposes of comparison across regions.

**"The HDI adjusts real income above a certain threshold, the underlying assumption being that people need a certain income to attain a decent standard of living and that income beyond a certain level has a diminishing marginal utility. The global HDI defines an income threshold for an acceptable standard of living as the world average income...the Namibian income threshold has been defined as the Namibian national average income..." UNDP, 1998, 106.

Table 11. HDI for Namibia, SSA and Other World Regions, 1999.

1999 Human Development Indic	es	_		
Region	Life	Adult	GDP Per	HDI 1999
	Expectancy	Literacy	Capita (PPP \$US)	
Namibia	44.9	81.4	5,468	0.601
Sub-Saharan Africa	48.8	59.6	1,640	0.564
Developing Countries	64.5	72.9	3,530	0.647
Least Developed Countries	51.7	51.6	1,170	0.442
Arab States	66.4	61.3	4,550	0.648
East Asia and the Pacific	69.2	85.3	3,950	0.719
Latin America and the Caribbean	69.6	87.8	6,880	0.760
South Asia	62.5	55.1	2,280	0.564

Source: UNDP, 2001, 143-144.

Table 12. Human Poverty Index (HPI) for Namibia, 2000.

2000 Human I	2000 Human Poverty Indices for Namibia									
Region	Non- Survival To 40	Illiteracy	Under Weight Children	No Safe Water	No Health Facilities	Over 80% Income On Food	HPI- N 2000	HPI- G 2000	HPI- N 1999	HPI- N 1998
Caprivi	53.7	24.6	8.4	25.2	42.0	7.0	36.0	39.6	32.7	25.0
Erongo	25.7	11.5	4.6	0.3	27.0	7.1	17.1	18.7	15.3	11.2
Hardap	36.2	19.3	13.9	3.3	43.0	4.7	25.0	27.5	22.8	19.1
Karas	35.5	11.4	16.7	0.2	43.0	4.1	23.8	26.2	21.4	16.0
Khomas	27.6	6.0	18.5	0.2	17.0	1.1	17.9	19.7	15.8	9.6
Kunene	28.7	35.7	4.2	10.2	47.0	11.3	27.0	29.6	26.3	24.8
Ohangwena	33.5	24.0	13.8	45.1	64.0	9.9	31.2	34.2	32.6	31.8
Kavango	38.5	26.9	17.8	34.6	38.0	19.6	30.3	32.6	29.7	27.2
Omaheke	31.2	36.0	4.9	4.2	89.0	25.1	31.7	33.4	31.0	30.5
Omusati	34.0	17.5	9.0	50.5	38.0	9.0	27.1	29.7	28.1	26.6
Oshana	32.4	14.6	15.5	18.5	54.0	5.5	25.0	27.5	24.3	22.0
Oshikoto	38.6	18.1	16.2	21.0	68.0	9.0	29.9	32.9	29.0	24.9
Otjozondjupa	37.0	28.0	5.6	1.4	52.0	10.8	27.3	29.9	25.3	21.0
Namibia	33.5	19.0	12.0	17.1	45.0	8.7	24.7	27.1	23.4	20.5

HPI-N Human Poverty Index – Namibian Formula; HPI-G Human Poverty Index – Global Formula. All figures are expressed as percentages.

Urban	27.3	8.3	0.1	7.0	2.6	17.4	19.1	15.2	16.7
Rural	36.1	26.3	29.1	65.0	11.8	29.0	31.8	36.4	24.7
Female	36.9	20.4	21.8	45.0	9.6	26.0	28.5	28.7	25.4
Male	30.1	17.4	14.2	45.0	8.1	21.7	23.8	24.2	22.6

Language Group	Non- Survival To 40	Illiteracy	Under Weight Children	No Safe Water	No Health Facilities	Over 80% Income On Food	HPI- N 2000	HPI- G 2000	HPI- N 1999	HPI- N 1998
Afrikaans	11.9	3.9		0.3	25.0	0.9	8.4	9.2	9.3	10.3
Caprivi/	27.0	20.1		11.5	45.0	5.2	20.5	22.6	23.1	37.6
English	12.4	1.4		0.0	10.0	0.0	7.9	8.7	7.0	7.1

German	3.8	0.6	0.0	29.0	0.0	6.2	6.8	9.2	9.2
Nama/D	24.1	28.9	1.9	51.0	8.6	22.3	24.4	23.7	28.6
Oshiwambo	20.1	17.2	29.4	50.0	7.8	20.0	22.0	29.4	38.8
Otjiherero	16.2	27.7	5.6	55.0	16.5	21.2	22.4	24.6	31.2
Rukavango	28.1	27.2	38.3	35.0	19.5	25.2	26.7	31.4	39.9
San	40.2	84.0	10.4	36.0	28.7	56.0	61.3	58.1	59.9
Tswana	19.5	19.0	2.1	38.0	0.0	16.1	17.7	17.2	19.0

Source: UNDP, 2000, 157.

Table 13. Human Poverty Indices for Selected Southern African Countries, 1999.

Country	Non-Survival To 40	Illiteracy	Under Weight Children	No Safe Water	HPI 1999
South Africa	24.1	15.1	9	14	18.7
Namibia	46.7	18.6	26	23	34.5
Botswana	49.5	23.6	17		
Zimbabwe	51.6	12.0	15	15	36.2
Lesotho	35.4	17.1	16	9	25.8
Zambia	53.6	22.8	24	36	40.0
Malawi	50.4	40.8	30	43	43.4
Mozambique	49.2	56.8	26	40	48.3

Source: UNDP, 2001, 149-151.

Table 14. Mean monthly income through wages and salaries*; highest five regions, 2000.

Region for Males	Amount in N\$	Region for Females	Amount in N\$
Khomas	2304	Khomas	1599
Hardap	1401	Hardap	906
Caprivi	1129	Caprivi	590
Erongo	1129	Omusati	450
Karas	1016	Karas	430

Table 15. Mean monthly income through wages and salaries; lowest five regions, 2000.

Region for Males	Amount in N\$	Region for Females	Amount in N\$
Omaheke	286	Omaheke	134
Ohangwena	431	Ohangwena	202
Kunene	444	Oshana	255
Oshikoto	445	Kavango	360
Otjozondjupa	672	Kunene	418

Source: Iipinge, etal, 97.* Other income sources include a wide range: from casual work, cash, inkind and educational remittances, from farm products, formal and informal businesses, pension and disability and other sources.

Table 16. Gender-related Indices for Southern Africa, 1999.

	Gender Related Development Index (GDI)		Female Adult Literacy %		Female Economic Activity Rate %		Female Seats in Parliament %	
	Rank	Value	Rate	%Male	Rate	%Male	Lower House or	
				Rate		Rate	Single House	
Angola					72.9	82	15.5	
Botswana	103	0.571	78.9	107	64.5	77	17.0	
Lesotho	111	0.528	93.3	130	47.3	56	3.8	
Malawi	137	0.386	45.3	61	78.2	90	9.3	
Mozambique	141	0.309	27.9	47	82.9	92	30.0	
Namibia	100	0.594	80.4	98	54	67	25.0	
South Africa	85	0.695	84.2	98	46.3	59	29.8	
Swaziland	102	0.575	77.9	97	42.1	52	3.1	
Zambia	127	0.420	70.2	83	65.3	76	10.1	
Zimbabwe	106	0.548	83.8	91	66.6	78	9.3	

Source: UNDP, 2001, 210-229.

Table 17. Official Development Assistance to Selected African Countries, 1999.

Country	Total (US\$ million)	Per capita (US\$)	As % of GDP
South Africa	539.3	12.8	0.4
Namibia	177.6	104.4	5.8
Swaziland	28.9	28.4	2.4
Botswana	60.9	38.3	1.0
Zimbabwe	244.2	20.5	4.4
Lesotho	31.1	14.8	3.6
Nigeria	151.6	1.2	0.4
Zambia	623.4	63.1	19.8
Angola	387.5	31.4	4.5
Malawi	445.8	41.3	24.6

Source: UNDP, 2001, 192-193.